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The eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of municipally
owned corporations: a systematic review
Bart Voorn, Marieke L. van Genugten and Sandra van Thiel
Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, Nijmegen, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Municipally owned corporations (MOCs) are increasingly utilised to provide
local public services, but little remains known about their eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness. In this article, we oﬀer a typology of MOCs, explore the variables
that aﬀect their behaviour, and perform a systematic review of public admin-
istration articles published between 2001 and 2015 on their eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness. We ﬁnd that MOCs are often more eﬃcient than local bureau-
cracies in the provision of services such as refuse collection, water distribution,
and transit services, although they also have high initial failure rates. We
conclude that municipally owned corporations are a viable means for deliver-
ing some local public services for localities capable of initiating and managing
complex contracts. In light of the scarcity of literature on this topic, our
conclusions remain tentative, and we encourage additional research into this
growing phenomenon.
KEYWORDS Local corporations; mixed enterprises; municipal companies; systematic review
1. Introduction
Municipally owned corporations (MOCs) are autonomous organisations
owned by municipalities, used to produce or deliver local public services
outside the local bureaucracy. A steadily increasing number of localities
utilise them for public service provision (Florio and Fecher 2011; Grossi
and Reichard 2008; Whincop 2005). Municipalities in Germany, Italy, and
The Netherlands utilise on average between 10 and 20 local corporations for
providing public services (Boogers et al. 2016; Grossi and Reichard 2008), a
large majority of municipalities in Portugal own at least one MOC (Tavares
and Camões 2007). Local corporations are also increasingly used for service
provision in the United States (Bunch 2000; Molinari and Tyer 2003) and
throughout Europe more broadly (Dexia Crediop 2004).
Despite the growing importance of MOCs, the literature on them remains
scarce. While much of local governance literature has been devoted to
CONTACT Bart Voorn b.voorn@fm.ru.nl Institute for Management Research, Radboud
University, Postbus 9018, Nijmegen 6500 HK, The Netherlands
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES, 2017
VOL. 43, NO. 5, 820–841
https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2017.1319360
© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered,
transformed, or built upon in any way.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
2:4
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
investigating the comparative eﬃciency of diﬀerent local service delivery
modes (Bel, Hebdon, and Warner 2007; Hefetz and Warner 2007; 2012;
Jossart-Mirelli and Musso 2005; Warner and Hebdon 2001), researchers
have focused primarily on comparing private and public production for
various services, and less on the eﬃciency of diﬀerent types of service
organisation within the public sector (Sørensen 2007; Pérez-López, Prior,
and Zafra-Gómez 2015). Those studies that do recognise that public sector
provision can occur in ways other than in-house provision usually consider
only a single delivery form, or consider it solely in the light of the trade-oﬀ
between public and private provision (Bel, Fageda, and Mur 2014; Benito,
Bastida, and García 2010; Dijkgraaf, Gradus, and Melenberg 2003; Simões,
Cavalho, and Marques 2013). Consequently, our empirical understanding of
the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of municipally owned corporations remains
limited.
Yet there are reasons to suspect that institutional diﬀerences between
MOCs and local bureaucracies may yield diﬀerences in eﬀectiveness and
eﬃciency (Bognetti and Robotti 2007; Da Cruz and Marques 2011; 2012;
Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2013; Marra 2007; Zafra-Gómez et al. 2013). Key to
understanding MOCs is their vast legal and managerial autonomy. While
local bureaucracies are constrained by municipal law safeguarding public
money, MOCs are often regulated by public or private commercial law
instead (Bel et al. 2010; Bognetti and Robotti 2007; Da Cruz and Marques
2011; Tavares and Camões 2007). Next, MOCs are often granted extensive
managerial autonomy and ﬂexibility in delivery (Bel and Fageda 2006;
Garrone, Grilli, and Rousseau 2013) by municipal owners seeking to remove
politics from service provision (Bourdeaux 2013). MOCs allow shared own-
ership, facilitating extensive cooperation between localities and between
public and private sector, allowing for cooperation as diverse as inter-
municipal enterprises or public–private partnerships. Moreover, MOCs diﬀer
from local bureaucracies in funding, transaction costs, ﬁnancial scrutiny,
labour rights, permission to operate outside their jurisdiction, and, under
some circumstances, in the right to make proﬁts and risk of bankruptcy (Bel
and Fageda 2010). Each of these factors may potentially cause MOCs’
greater or lesser eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency.
Do MOCs diﬀer in eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness from local bureaucracies,
and if so, what factors bring this diﬀerence about? In this article, we oﬀer a
typology of MOCs, explore the variables that aﬀect their behaviour, and
perform a systematic literature review of public administration studies
between 2001 and 2015 on their eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness. We ﬁnd that
while MOCs often have high initial failure rate, they are also often more
eﬃcient than bureaucracies in the provision of services such as refuse
collection, water distribution, and transit services, although our conclusions
remain tentative in light of the scarcity of the literature.
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The remainder is organised as follows. The next section oﬀers a deﬁnition
of MOCs. In Section 3, we explore the diﬀerences between MOCs and local
bureaucracies and formulate hypotheses about eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness
based on the literature. Next, in Section 4, we discuss our methods for
ﬁnding articles and oﬀer descriptive statistics about the state of the litera-
ture. In Section 5, we systematically review the literature on MOCs, testing
our hypotheses using the empirical ﬁndings. In Section 6, we summarise the
state of the literature, discuss implications of our ﬁndings, and explicate this
study’s limitations. In Section 7, we conclude.
2. Municipally owned corporations
The advent of New Public Management in the 1980s brought a shift towards
involving markets in producing public services (Van Genugten 2008). By the
1990s, contracting out local services was a growing trend in the United
States (Hefetz and Warner 2007) and Europe (Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-
Gómez 2015). Initial studies showed large cost savings (Domberger and
Jensen 1997; Domberger and Rimmer 1994; Hodge 2000). However, these
cost savings were later found to diminish over time (Bel and Costas 2006;
Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2011). By the early 2000s, local governments were
bringing more contracted services back into public provision than they were
contracting out (Hefetz and Warner 2007; Wollmann et al. 2010).
Some municipalities began experimenting with municipally owned cor-
porations (MOCs). MOCs are corporations constituted by municipalities to
provide typically a single service, most often bus services, water and sew-
erage services, and refuse collection. They diﬀer from bureaucracy in that
they are governed by appointed executive boards and have independent
corporate status (Bel and Fageda 2006). Some MOCs rely on revenue from
user fees, distinguishing them from agencies and special districts funded
through taxation (Tavares and Camões 2007). MOCs are typically identiﬁed
as single-purpose organisations operating under private law (Bel et al. 2010;
Bel and Fageda 2010; Warner and Bel 2008), although MOCs can be multi-
purpose (Bognetti and Robotti 2007) and operate under public law in
various countries, including The Netherlands and Norway (Torsteinsen and
Van Genugten 2016). Finally, municipalities retain ultimate control through
ownership (Bel and Fageda 2006). Since ownership can be transferred, MOCs
can facilitate cooperation between localities and between municipalities and
the private sector. Table 1 illustrates typical diﬀerences between MOCs and
bureaucracy. Factors in italics describe typical cases and factors in normal
font describe identifying features.
It can quickly be perceived that MOCs are not easily deﬁned, which can
explain why, to our knowledge, only Tavares and Camões (2007) established
a deﬁnition. They describe (Portuguese) MOCs as single-purpose public
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organisations, dependent on user fees, with independent corporate status
and governed by an executive board appointed by local government oﬃ-
cials, although as mentioned we also discovered MOCs that rely on tax
revenues (also in Portugal) and are multi-purpose organisations.
For this article, we deﬁne MOCs as organisations:
(1) with independent corporate status (i.e. with legal autonomy);
(2) managed by an executive board appointed primarily by local govern-
ment oﬃcials (with managerial autonomy);
(3) with majority public ownership.
3. Theory and hypotheses
In this section, we theorise about the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of MOCs.
We focus on the eﬀects of the factors that distinguish MOCs from bureau-
cracy: (i) legal autonomy; (ii) managerial autonomy; and (iii) majority public
ownership.
3.1. Legal autonomy
Much has been written about the economic eﬀects of the legal autonomy
that is granted to keep operators at arm’s length of public oﬃcials. In the
literature on authority-operator dynamics, transaction cost economics
(Williamson 1981) has been applied to study various political institutions
and modes of public service delivery. The consensus in this literature is that
as distance between the regulator and the service operator grows, monitor-
ing mechanisms become more important, the authority’s objectives are less
often satisﬁed, and contracts more likely fail. This eﬀect is typically strongest
in smaller jurisdictions and with services that are more technical and have
less overt public objectives (Brown and Potoski 2003a, 2003b).
Transaction costs matter because distance between authority and opera-
tor may create goal divergence, information asymmetries, and principal-
agent problems such as operators hiding information or shirking public
Table 1. Production by enterprise and bureaucracy compared.
Provision by
MOC Bureaucracy
Legal status Corporation Government
Governed under Multiple options Public municipal law
Organisation form Single-purpose Multi-purpose
Governed by Appointed executive board Local bureaucracy
Funded through User fees Taxes
Cooperative ﬂexibility High Medium
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orders. A wide array of capacities is necessary to mitigate such costs (Brown
and Potoski 2003a), including research capacity, technical knowledge, eco-
nomic knowledge, legal expertise, negotiation skills, and network access.
Particularly for smaller municipalities managing more complex services, such
capacities are not self-evident. Fortunately, transaction costs can shrink
when the regulator and operator have a good working relationship
(Agranoﬀ and McGuire 2003; Jeﬀries and Reed 2000; Williamson 1985), but
distance typically brings such costs nonetheless.
Separating politics from service provision also has upsides. Eﬃciency
may be impaired when politicians are involved in the provision of
services, who may face incentives to sacriﬁce eﬃciency for increasing
re-election chances (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). There is, for instance,
evidence that employees receive more protection and are hired in
greater numbers at higher wages in public ﬁrms than in private ﬁrms
(Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1996; Savage 1993; White 1997). The
further politics is removed from service provision, the less rent seeking
can transpire (Shleifer and Vishny 1994).
How does this relate to MOCs? Municipally owned corporations may
be kept at distance from the bureaucracy, but are not uniformly so.
Relational ties between the MOC’s executive board and the public actor
are not always properly deﬁned. While typically public actors appoint
executive boards that share their plans and objectives, the executive
board is often given leeway in their management precisely to introduce
distance between the operator and the bureaucracy. In other scenarios,
the public actor may meticulously dictate policy.
Hence, MOCs vary in transaction costs, which increase as MOCs gain
distance from the authority. Because of information asymmetries and
transaction costs, MOCs may have a higher initial failure rate than
bureaucracy does, particularly for technical services, services with less
overt public objectives, and in smaller municipalities, which may have
less contract-management capacity. Beyond this phase, as contracts
become more speciﬁc, responsibilities become clear and mutual under-
standing grows, downsides may diminish, making MOCs more eﬀective
and eﬃcient than bureaucracy.
Hypothesis 1a: MOCs have a substantial initial failure rate, but if this can be
overcome, MOCs are more eﬃcient than bureaucracy.
Hypothesis 1b: MOCs’ initial failure rate is lower for services that are less
technical and for which there are overt public objectives.
Hypothesis 1c: MOCs fail less initially in larger municipalities.
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3.2. Managerial autonomy
While it is diﬃcult to pinpoint exact diﬀerences, since MOCs are subject to
diﬀerent sets of laws across countries (Dexia Crediop 2004), not falling under
municipal law means that MOCs are typically subject to less ﬁnancial scru-
tiny and have more discretion in personnel management (Tavares and
Camões 2007; Da Cruz and Marques 2011). Consequently, MOCs may have
a cost advantage in overhead and labour costs, although the extent to
which this advantage exists depends on government employee protection
and strictness of ﬁnancial regulation of the public sector compared to the
private sector. However, this may not happen everywhere: in countries
where labour unions are relatively powerful, such as in Spain and Portugal,
unions have been known to demand higher salaries for the same jobs to
accept the creation of MOCs, to compensate for workers’ reduced job
security.
Hypothesis 2: MOCs have lower labour costs than local bureaucracies.
3.3. Flexible majority public ownership
The ﬁnal characteristic of MOCs is ﬂexible majority public ownership. Unlike
local bureaucracies, MOCs can be owned by multiple localities or shared by
the public and private sector (Da Cruz and Marques 2013). Such shared
ownership brings the potential for both welfare-detrimental conﬂict and
welfare-beneﬁcial cooperation.
Cooperation between localities can exploit economies of scale (Bel,
Fageda, and Mur 2014; Bel and Warner 2015), thwart rent seeking by
politicians by making steering more diﬃcult (Shleifer and Vishny 1994),
and allow risk sharing between municipalities, reducing intertemporal bud-
get volatility. The drawback is that shared ownership may intensify princi-
pal–agent problems, as the operator must serve multiple masters (Van Thiel
2016; Waterman and Meier 1998). Conﬂict may break out between localities
over objectives, incentives to monitor the service are diluted, and localities
lose some control over their service provision. It is from theory unclear
whether eﬃciency gains from cooperation may oﬀset eﬃciency losses
from reduced ownership and control.
Similarly, cooperation between the public and private sector (which can
occur when the locality sells some of the MOC’s shares to a private entity)
can bring both eﬃciency gains and losses. Eﬃciency is increased by the
introduction of private expertise, the stimulation of good management
through proﬁt incentives, risk sharing with the private sector, and limiting
of opportunistic behaviour by the political body (Bognetti and Robotti 2007;
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STUDIES 825
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Marra 2007). In the best scenario, such cooperation brings an optimal
combination of incentives for reducing costs and improving quality in
comparison with pure production forms (Schmitz 2000), because private
ﬁrms providing public services may care little about quality erosion (Hart,
Shleifer, and Vishny 1997).
However, the risk of conﬂict is greater, as private and public objectives
can conﬂict. Since the locality usually keeps most of the MOC’s shares,
private partners are unlikely to buy shares without ﬁrst obtaining important
contractual rights, and thus public objectives do not always trump private
objectives. Moreover, when contracts require renegotiation, the private
partner has a powerful bargaining position as the incumbent (Cruz and
Marques 2013).
When MOCs have multiple principals, potential for eﬃciency gains exists.
This potential increases when the private sector gets involved. However, a
potential for conﬂict also exists, which likewise increases when the private
sector gets involved. Long-operating MOCs are more likely to have solved
their conﬂicts.
Hypothesis 3a: MOCs with multiple owners have a higher initial failure rate,
but bring large eﬃciency gains if this can be overcome.
Hypothesis 3b: Mixed (public-private) MOCs have the highest initial failure
rate and the highest eﬃciency potential.
4. Data and methods
The articles incorporated in this study were selected in three stages. First, we
speciﬁed a deﬁnition that articles had to meet for inclusion and system-
atically examined eighteen public administration (PA) journals for
2001–2015 to collect relevant articles. Second, we reviewed all references
within these articles to include papers outside these eighteen PA journals
we missed before. Third, we identiﬁed the journals outside the eighteen PA
journals where most research originated and examined all articles published
between 2001 and 2015 in those journals as well.
For inclusion in this study, an article was required to:
● exceed a length of four pages;
● concern itself primarily with the production or provision of a local
service;
● discuss production or provision through a municipally owned corpora-
tion in the abstract or introduction; and
● discuss eﬀects thereof.
826 B. VOORN ET AL.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
ad
bo
ud
 U
niv
ers
ite
it N
ijm
eg
en
] a
t 0
2:4
9 1
9 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
7 
In stage 1, only PA journals were selected with a 2015 SJR ranking
exceeding 1.0 (SCImago Research Group 2016) (see Table 2). The ﬁrst author
systematically examined the abstracts and introductions of all articles in
these journals for 2001–2015, including articles meeting our deﬁnition in a
database. In total, we retrieved eight articles in this stage, four of which
were published in Public Administration. These papers varied in data origin,
methods, and the sector and structure studied. For internal validity, the co-
authors replicated this review for six journal volumes. After extensive dis-
cussion and deliberation, this led to the inclusion of one extra article to the
database.
In the second stage, we examined all reference lists in the previously
retrieved articles and added studies for 2001–2015 that ﬁt our deﬁnition.
Through this process, we added 12 new articles from eight journals to the
database. Two journals, Local Government Studies and Annals of Public and
Cooperative Economics, had produced more than one article relevant for our
deﬁnition, both adding three articles to our database. Therefore, in stage 3,
we examined all articles for 2001–2015 published in these journals, ﬁnding
no new papers meeting our deﬁnition.
Altogether, our search rendered 21 articles from 13 journals. Table 3
oﬀers descriptive statistics.
5. Results
Table 4 summarises the articles incorporated in this study. There is much
variation in the constructs investigated, the countries and industries studied,
and the methodology of the articles. As a result, we cannot conduct a
Table 2. The eighteen PA journals by SJR ranking.
Journal SJR
Administrative Science Quarterly 10.565
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 5.400
Educational Administration Quarterly 2.945
Public Administration Review 2.530
Governance 2.126
Journal of European Public Policy 1.975
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 1.843
American Review of Public Administration 1.699
International Public Management Journal 1.696
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 1.568
Journal of Public Relations Research 1.544
Public Administration 1.460
Regulation and Governance 1.437
Review of Public Personnel Administration 1.376
Policy Studies Journal 1.299
Human Resources for Health 1.193
Journal of Information Technology and Politics 1.092
Review of Policy Research 1.058
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quantitative meta-analysis of the research, and instead make inferences
based on the similarities and diﬀerences between the articles.
Throughout the analysis, we will discuss MOCs’ eﬃciency and eﬀective-
ness. Like Vining, Boardman, and Moore (2014), we must ask: eﬃciency and
eﬀectiveness compared to what? As a baseline, we will assess MOCs’ eﬀec-
tiveness and eﬃciency compared to that of bureaucracy, although not every
study included makes this comparison. We again attempt to enable such
comparisons by synthesising the diﬀerent papers treating the topic.
From here on, we refer to MOCs owned by a single locality as a ‘singular
MOC’. MOCs owned by several localities are ‘joint MOCs’ and MOCs owned
by the locality, and a private actor is ‘mixed MOCs’.
5.1. Legal autonomy eﬀects
5.1.1. Failure rates and eﬃciency
Our database incorporates 21 studies of MOCs, but we limit ourselves in this
subsection to the discussion of singular MOCs, to separate the eﬀects of
legal autonomy from those of dispersed ownership.
Nine articles in our database compare singular MOCs to non-MOC deliv-
ery modes. These studies are not uniformly positive about MOCs’ eﬃciency:
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of included studies.
Period Studies
2001–2005 3
2006–2010 8
2011–2015 10
Country
Spain 5
Italy /The Netherlands /Portugal 3
USA 2
Others 1 each
Industry
Refuse collection 14
Transit 9
Water management 8
Urban services /health services 2
Type
Single-owned 15
Shared public–private 11
Joint public–public 8
Methodology
Regression 14
Case study 6
Other 1
Journal
Public Administration 4
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 3
Local Government Studies 3
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 3
Others 1 each (8 total)
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like state enterprises, singular MOCs are found to be ineﬃcient when not
exposed to competitive pressures (Albalate et al. 2012; Bognetti and Robotti
2007). Indeed, when governments put up barriers to entry, they insulate
MOCs from competition and remove market pressure to maximise their
eﬃciency.
However, the large-N studies all show that singular MOCs are quite
eﬃcient when exposed to market pressures. Singular MOCs were slightly
more eﬃcient than private ﬁrms for refuse collection in Sweden (Ohlsson
2003), and comparable in eﬃciency to private ﬁrms in the US bus industry
(Zullo 2008). Bourdeaux (2013) ﬁnds that MOCs have a more professional
focus than bureaucracies; and in the quality of life study of Cuadrado-
Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, and Prado-Lorenzo. (2012), singular MOCs
were preferred over bureaucracy in all industries. In Pérez-López, Prior,
and Zafra-Gómez (2015), singular MOCs (deﬁned as ‘agencies’) had higher
eﬃciency in some industries but worse in others. Berlin transit operator BVG
gained eﬃciency in transitioning from a municipal unit to public law cor-
poration, which allowed labour restructuring (Swarts and Warner 2014).
Of the studies included, only one suggests that singular MOCs may do
worse than bureaucracy (Da Cruz and Marques 2011). The authors point out
that in Portugal, MOCs are rarely subject to competition, have little auton-
omy, and are diﬃcult to regulate since the (centralised) regulator is hesitant
to infringe upon local delivery choices. Moreover, they have in several
instances led to overlapping functions between MOCs and municipalities,
demonstrating that coordinating responsibilities is not always an easy task.
However, they too point out that, if these problems are solved, MOCs may
well do better than bureaucracy.
Overall, there is tentative evidence that singular MOCs have eﬃciency
advantages over the bureaucracy in at least some industries, mostly because
they substitute politics for professionalism (Bourdeaux 2013). Here, however,
the general point that MOCs have high initial failure rates stands too. This is
the most important ﬁnding in Bourdeaux (2013): while MOCs are more likely
to deliver services professionally, they are vulnerable to political conﬂicts
(over goals), which are arbitraged away in bureaucracy delivery. Similarly, Da
Cruz and Marques (2011) caution that lacking well-deﬁned responsibilities
for the MOC, bureaucracy may be the better policy channel.
Large-N studies into the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of single-owned
MOCs inform us that singular MOCs are a viable policy instrument when
compared to private ﬁrms or local bureaucracy delivery, but case studies
demonstrate that, in individual cases, failure is a real possibility. The empiri-
cal literature thus corroborates hypothesis 1a. Singular MOCs may yield
eﬃciency gains compared to bureaucracy, but it is imperative to exhaus-
tively negotiate goals, expectations, incentives, and responsibilities to assure
MOCs can meet these expectations.
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5.1.2. MOCs across sectors
Only two studies (Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, and Prado-Lorenzo.
2012; Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez 2015) actively distinguished
across and between service sectors in analysing how MOCs compare to
bureaucracy. In Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, and Prado-Lorenzo.
(2012), MOCs were found to provide more quality of life than local bureau-
cracy in all sectors. Meanwhile, Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez (2015)
ﬁnd diﬀerent eﬃciency performances across sectors. Particularly, MOCs
demonstrate higher eﬃciency in the waste, water, and development. In
contrast, MOCs are found to be signiﬁcantly less eﬃcient in culture and in
urban services and less eﬃcient in social and transit services. The results of
these studies are not necessarily contradictory as the studies measure
diﬀerent things: while Cuadrado-Ballesteros, García-Sánchez, and Prado-
Lorenzo. (2012) measure service satisfaction (in essence, quality perception),
Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez (2015) measure cost eﬃciency. It is
plausible that MOCs, in the Spanish context of local government austerity,
can better safeguard quality than local bureaucracies.
Nevertheless, the ﬁndings of Pérez-López, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez (2015)
provide tentative albeit limited evidence that MOCs do better in services
that are less technical and which have overt public objectives. The empirical
ﬁnding that MOCs do comparatively better in refuse collection, water man-
agement, and development than in providing culture and social services is
in line with our notion that MOCs face lesser coordination issues when
objectives are clear-cut and non-politicised. Altogether, however, evidence
is too scarce to accept hypothesis 1b, although the data lend tentative
support for it.
5.1.3. MOCs across municipalities
We also aimed to investigate if MOCs fail less often in populous urban
municipalities than in smaller rural ones. Unfortunately, only one study of
joint MOCs makes this distinction, ﬁnding that smaller municipalities gain
from cooperation through scale economies (Bel and Warner 2015), but
beyond that data are absent. Consequently, we cannot corroborate or falsify
hypothesis 1c.
5.2. Managerial autonomy eﬀects
We were unable to falsify or contradict hypothesis 2 that MOCs have lower
labour costs. None of the incorporated studies discusses how labour costs in
MOCs compare to those in bureaucracy. Some studies report that labour
costs are higher in singular MOCs than in mixed MOCs (Swarts and Warner
2014) or private ﬁrms (Albalate et al. 2012), but empirical evidence com-
pared to bureaucracy lacks.
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5.3. Ownership eﬀects
5.3.1. Joint MOCs
In our database, seven studies discuss joint MOCs. Garrone, Grilli, and
Rousseau (2013) and Sørensen (2007) emphasise that the managerial auton-
omy of joint MOCs creates monitoring problems in Norway (Sørensen 2007)
and goal conﬂict in Italy (Garrone, Grilli, and Rousseau 2013), which out-
weigh gains from the exploitation of economies of scale. Bel and Fageda
(2006) and Zafra-Gómez et al. (2013) observe the opposite eﬀect in Spain,
ﬁnding that small localities gain eﬃciency from cooperation with other
localities through public ﬁrms. In the Dutch waste industry, MOCs do better
than bureaucracy (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2003) and as well as private ﬁrms
(Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2003; 2007). They also lower the costs of service
provision in localities where they compete in auctions, even when the bid
is eventually won by another party (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008).
What explains these contradictory ﬁndings? Bel and Warner (2015)
answer this in their review of studies on inter-municipal cooperation. First,
Norwegian municipalities tend to be larger than those in Spain, leaving
more economies of scale to be captured in Spain (while small localities
were under-represented in the study of Garrone, Grilli, and Rousseau
2013). Second, joint MOCs in Spain are managed by a single authority to
which municipalities delegate, while in Italy and Norway multiple munici-
palities are directly on the board of MOCs. Bel and Warner (2015) suggest
that political transaction costs are higher with multi-government ownership,
which is consistent with our hypothesis 3a that failure rates of MOCs
increase under dispersed ownership. The Dutch counterexample is
explained away by the (then) prevalence of unit-based pricing, which is
associated with lower costs.
Our hypothesis further suggests that we should observe variation in joint
MOCs between MOCs that struggle under joint ownership and fail and
MOCs that manage to overcome problems and reap the rewards of coop-
eration. Unfortunately, we lack empirical data to falsify these claims. The
scarcity of literature on joint MOCs, in conjunction with the preponderance
of large-N studies in this literature, leaves such micro-level analysis
impossible.
5.3.2. Mixed MOCs
Eight articles discuss mixed MOCs. Five studies, all large-N studies, ﬁnd that
mixed MOCs realise real eﬃciency gains (Bognetti and Robotti 2007; Filippini
and Prioni 2003; Garrone, Grilli, and Rousseau 2013; Marra 2007; Pérez-
López, Prior, and Zafra-Gómez 2015). Furthermore, three other studies, all
small-N case studies, emphasise potential eﬃciency gains from mixed MOCs,
but show that these could not come to long-term fruition due to goal
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conﬂict and negotiation problems (Da Cruz and Marques 2012; Marques and
Berg 2011) or labour conﬂict (Swarts and Warner 2014). Only Roy and
Yvrande-Billon (2007) (a large N-study) ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of mixed
MOCs in technical eﬃciency.
The ﬁve large-N studies that positively evaluate the eﬃciency eﬀects of mixed
MOCs study their economic eﬃciency (i.e. proﬁts or total costs), while the one
that ﬁnds negative eﬀects studies more narrowly technical eﬃciency (i.e. what
outputs they can produce with the resources available). Roy and Yvrande-Billon
(2007) suggest that mixed MOCs may do worse due to opportunism by both the
public and private partner (i.e. goal conﬂict) or diﬃculty in attributing responsi-
bilities (i.e. incomplete contracts). However, performance diﬀerentials were only
small, and mixed MOCs have more than double the variation in performance
scores than singular MOCs. Thismay be congruent with an environment in which
some mixed MOCs fail, while others are successful.
The case studies of mixed MOCs corroborate hypothesis 3b that mixed
MOCs have the highest initial failure rates but the highest eﬃciency potential.
Da Cruz and Marques (2012) narrate particular cases where mixed MOCs faced
goal conﬂicts and where contracts required costly renegotiation shortly after
their founding, and Marques and Berg (2011) discuss in-depth the diﬃculty in
saliently writing up contracts for mixed MOCs, giving recommendations on
how to prevent contract failure. Swarts and Warner (2014) highlight a case
where a mixed MOC provided immediate gains in eﬃciency, mostly through
labour restructuring, which were eroded by subsequent unionisation.
In sum, the empirical evidence supports hypothesis 3a and 3b: MOCs with
dispersed ownership bring large eﬃciency gains but come with a large
chance of failure. Public–private mixed MOCs have a larger failure potential
but a higher eﬃciency potential than public–public joint MOCs.
6. Discussion
Our prediction about the eﬀects of legal autonomy on the eﬃciency of
MOCs was supported by the data. MOCs, on aggregate, are more eﬃcient
than local bureaucracies (hypothesis 1a), at least in refuse collection, waste
management, and transit services. Simultaneously, the data corroborate the
hypothesis that transaction costs and principal-agent problems induce a
higher chance of failure (hypothesis 1a). This chance of failure increases
under joint or mixed ownership (hypotheses 3a and 3b), which exacerbate
transaction costs and principal–agent problems, and particularly the pro-
blem of serving multiple masters (Da Cruz and Marques 2012; Van Thiel
2016; Waterman and Meier 1998) is pressing and should be studied further.
However, if these problems are overcome, cooperation with the private
sector or between localities through a MOC can be very beneﬁcial, as the
data demonstrate (hypotheses 3a and 3b).
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Our data were insuﬃcient to corroborate or contradict our hypotheses
about eﬃciency diﬀerences across municipality and service types (hypoth-
eses 1b and 1c). Since the three most discussed sectors in the literature
(water management, refuse collection, and transit services) are all often
grouped as ‘utilities’ and are relatively homogeneous (they all involve infra-
structure, have relatively overt public objectives, and are relatively capital-
intensive), we cannot infer direct eﬀects of service technicality (hypothesis
1b) or of labour intensity (hypothesis 2), although there is tentative evidence
that overt and non-politicised public objectives make MOCs more likely to
succeed (hypothesis 1b).
There remains much scope for research into MOCs. While studies have
been done into MOCs operating in utilities, there have been few studies into
MOCs in other sectors, such as in health care, culture, or welfare services.
MOCs have been studied more in some countries (in particular in Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) than in others, and in Europe, particularly
the mixed (public-private) form of MOC seems more prevalent in the
Mediterranean countries than in the rest of Europe. Beyond being speciﬁc,
data are also scarce. Our research spanned 20 journals for 15 years, plus the
references in relevant articles, for an estimated 12,000 articles, of which only
21 (<0.2%) discussed eﬀects of MOCs. Since many questions remain unan-
swered, we invite researchers to ﬁll in the research gaps.
We should note that literature on MOCs exists beyond what we have
examined. While we have limited this study to discussion of eﬀects of MOCs,
there exists a body of literature (Bel and Fageda 2010; Gradus, Elbert
Dijkgraaf, and Wassenaar 2014; Rodrigues, Tavares, and De Araújo 2012;
Røiseland 2011; Tavares and Camões 2007) examining the causes of MOCs.
Moreover, we did not discuss (chapters in) books and publications in other
sources than peer-reviewed academic journals, which increased our study’s
reliability at the expense of its sample size. This is a limitation of this study,
as good studies have been conducted outside of peer-reviewed journals
(see: Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2014; Hulst and Van Montfort. 2007; Wollmann
and Marcou 2010), although we are aware of none that challenge our
ﬁndings. Similarly, we may have missed studies published in other lan-
guages than English or that used vocabulary or abstracts and introductions
that obscured the fact that they discussed MOCs.
On that note, we encourage researchers to be speciﬁc about the type of
public organisation they are investigating. We found that researchers often
group together and juxtapose ‘public’ and ‘private’ ﬁrms without accurately
specifying what form of public organisations they investigate, leaving the
reader unable to infer (multiplicity of) ownership, applicable laws, and
whether the author discussed public ﬁrms, in-house production, or a com-
bination of both.
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7. Conclusion
We make ﬁve main observations about MOCs. First, large eﬃciency gains
can be and are realised through MOCs. Second, MOCs used for coopera-
tion with the private sector can potentially yield even larger eﬃciency
gains. Third, there is tentative evidence that MOCs used for inter-munici-
pal cooperation can gain eﬃciency when scale economies are present
only if problems of dispersed ownership can be overcome; the Spanish
approach of delegating joint MOCs to one authority is one potential
solution to this. Fourth, MOCs have a high initial failure risk resulting
from goal conﬂict and principal–agent problems; localities need contract-
ing capacity to mitigate this risk. Fifth, more ownership dispersion implies
a higher risk of failure, and the problem of serving multiple masters, what
we call the multiple principal problem, is a pressing one for (public)
organisations.
It is important to emphasise that we deal with scarce and heteroge-
neous data: we have reviewed a limited number of cases, diﬀering in
service sector, country, and organisation type. In view of this limitation
and in view of the fact that multiple things about MOCs remain unknown,
we encourage additional research about how MOCs fare in diﬀerent
institutional environments and across service sectors, and about the
speciﬁc processes in which the problems MOCs face initially can be and
are overcome.
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